digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship

Articles & Chapters

2009

Hedge Funds and the Financial Crisis
Houman B. Shadab

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons

New York Law School Legal Studies
Research Paper Series 09/10 #31

Hedge Funds and the Financial Crisis
By:

Houman B. Shadab
Professor, New York Law School

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from the
Social Science Research Network at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1564847
New York Law School’s website can be accessed at
www.nyls.edu

No. 34
January 2009

MERCATUS
ON POLICY
HEDGE FUNDS AND THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS
By Houman B. shadab

T

he performance of hedge funds during the
financial crisis suggests that wide-ranging
financial regulation is not always necessary
to advance investor protection and financial
stability. While 2008 was a year of record
hedge fund losses and investor withdrawals that came
about in part because many hedge fund managers failed to
adequately respond to the financial crisis, the hedge fund
industry significantly outperformed the heavily regulated
mutual fund sector and, unlike the banking industry, was
never in jeopardy of collapsing. Hedge funds did not cause
or meaningfully exacerbate the financial crisis and in fact
have reduced its impact and are helping the economy
to recover.
BackgRound

An investment fund is a collection of money gathered
from investors for the purpose of having the money managed
by an investment adviser. Hedge funds are a type of private
investment fund. Typically, hedge funds function by making
very frequent trades in stocks, bonds, and financial derivatives.1 Some, however, do make relatively long-term investments, even in assets other than financial instruments (such
as real estate and commodities). In an attempt to ensure that
only financially sophisticated parties invest in hedge funds,
federal law does not permit hedge funds to raise capital
through widespread advertising or solicitation and prohibits
them from accepting funds from individuals having less than
$200,000 in annual income or companies having less than
$5,000,000 in assets.2 After suffering a trillion dollars in losses
and investor withdrawals in 2008, at the start of 2009, hedge
funds worldwide managed a total of $1.84 trillion in assets.3
Although both mutual fund and hedge fund managers are
compensated by charging a management fee based upon the
size of the fund (typically 1 to 2 percent for hedge funds),
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hedge fund managers also charge an annual performancebased fee, typically 20 percent of profits and, unlike mutual
fund managers, often invest their own money in the funds
they manage.4 This compensation structure generally leads
hedge funds to be more prudent in risk-taking than other
financial companies.
Hedge Fund Regulation
Hedge funds are not subject to the full range of disclosure requirements and limitations on investment activities that federal law imposes on publicly registered mutual
funds. However, hedge funds are fully subject to federal prohibitions on fraud, insider trading, and price manipulation.
Hedge funds typically make substantial and timely disclosures
to their investors,5 have the risks they take on monitored by
creditors and counterparties,6 and are required by law to
publicly disclose their large investments in public companies
and certain short sale positions to federal regulators.7 Hedge
funds also typically use third parties, such as prime brokers,
custodians, and administrators that have direct access to the
fund’s assets and are able verify the fund’s actual investment
returns.8 The hedge fund legal regime and associated business practices provide substantial assurances against fraud
and other forms of wrongdoing. The multibillion dollar Ponzi
scheme fraud carried out by Bernard Madoff was made possible in part because Madoff did not manage a hedge fund and
did not utilize independent services providers.

Investment Activities and Risk Reduction
In addition to buying stocks, bonds, and other financial
instruments to be later sold at a higher price, hedge funds
often engage in non-traditional investment strategies involving short selling and derivatives trading.9 Hedge funds can use
a far wider array of investment strategies than mutual funds
because hedge funds are not subject to the investment activity
restrictions of the Investment Company Act.10
Hedge funds use short sales and derivatives to manage risk
and reduce losses when the overall market is performing
poorly. This practice is difficult for mutual funds because of
the legal restrictions on their investment activities. In addition, hedge funds often borrow funds or use other forms of
leverage to magnify gains. Using leverage, however, also has
the potential to magnify losses.
Although some hedge funds are highly leveraged, such funds
are the exception rather than the rule. A 2007 study of hedge
fund leverage by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimated that average hedge
fund leverage was 3.9 to 1, which means that for every 3.9 dollars in hedge fund assets, one dollar was equity and the rest
was borrowed (or the economic equivalent of borrowing was
achieved by using derivatives).11 By contrast, banking sector
leverage generally ranges from about 12 to 1 to 17 to 1 while
major U.S. investment bank leverage in particular ranged from
20 to 1 to as high as 33 to 1 in recent years.12

FIgure 1: Hedge funds versus u.s. stock market from 1990 to 2008
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By pursuing non-traditional investment strategies with the
incentives created by their unique compensation structure,
hedge funds have historically helped reduce their investors’
exposures to overall risks. Because hedge funds provide a
cushion to their investors from overall market downturns,
hedge funds help investors to diversify their portfolios and
not keep all their eggs in one basket. Despite losing 18.3 percent of their value in 2008,13 Figure 1 illustrates that even after
fees hedge funds consistently outperformed the stock market
when the market produced losses for investors.
The Role of Hedge Funds in the Financial Crisis
Hedge funds did not cause the ongoing financial crisis.
They are reducing the crisis’ overall impact and helping the
economy to recover.
The financial crisis stems from unsound business practices
and poorly crafted regulation in the mortgage, banking, and
credit markets. Hedge funds were not the primary investors
in securities backed by mortgages and therefore did not create
an excessive demand for banks to make risky mortgage loans.14
Hedge funds did become significant players in the markets for
buying and selling credit instruments,15 and academics and
organizations like the International Monetary Fund have
found that hedge funds’ involvement in credit markets made
the markets more stable and efficient.16
During the financial crisis, hedge funds have increasingly purchased other companies’ poorly performing securities, including
mortgage-backed securities, and made loans that help borrowers
in otherwise tight credit conditions.17 By purchasing poorly performing mortgage-backed securities, hedge funds are helping
to keep asset prices from declining further, which may help
to reduce taxpayers’ responsibilities for funding bailouts and
economic stimulus measures.
Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk
Growth in the number and size of hedge funds and the
increasing interconnectedness of global financial markets has
raised concerns about “systemic risk”: the extent to which
hedge funds pose a risk to the entire, or at least large portions of, the financial system. The theory is that if one large
or several smaller hedge funds experience losses, these losses
may spread to other financial institutions and in turn severely
undermine the stability of the financial system.
In practice, however, hedge funds likely would not pose a
threat to the stability of financial markets. Hedge funds seem
to become less prone to collapsing as their size grows, and
when a hedge fund does shut down it is more likely to happen after a steady decline in returns than a sudden, surprising
crash.18 Moreover, the risk-management practices of hedge
funds, the parties that hedge funds trade with, and hedge fund

lenders are generally sufficient to prevent hedge fund losses
from disrupting the broader financial system. For example,
most hedge funds limit their borrowings from the prime brokerage divisions of banks far below what banks are willing
to lend, which helps to ensure that banks are well protected
against hedge fund losses.19
In September 2006, the $6.6 billion hedge fund Amaranth
Advisors set an industry record for the largest hedge fund
collapse, yet its creditors and the broader financial system
experienced no significant disruptions. Financial economists
have even found that hedge fund losses have not spread to
the general economy.20 The recent economic turmoil is a case
in point. Widespread and sustained losses in the hedge fund
industry did not begin until June of 2008, several months
after the stock market began to experience persistent monthly
losses and a recession was already underway.
Conclusion
The legal regime applicable to hedge funds helps protect
investors against market downturns by providing managers with the flexibility to adopt a wide range of investment
strategies and incentives to strike a relatively healthy balance between risk taking and risk management. The outcomes hedge funds produce for their investors on the whole
and their lack of a direct role in the financial crisis indicate
that there is no hedge fund market failure that demands additional government regulation. Indeed, additional regulation
might hurt investors and the economy. For instance, restricting hedge funds’ ability to use leverage could increase economic instability because certain investment strategies that
reduce market fluctuations require substantial leverage to be
effective.21
Moreover, additional government oversight may increase
complacency, undermine ongoing private efforts to improve
best practices, and overwhelm regulators with duties beyond
their resources and abilities. In recent years, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) devoted unprecedented
resources to enforcement with an aggressiveness among the
highest of all securities regulators.22 Yet the Bernard Madoff
scandal and the collapse of investment banks have shown that
the SEC nonetheless failed to exercise appropriate oversight
or adequately enforce existing laws. Creating an even more
expansive system of securities regulation is therefore unlikely
to increase the SEC’s overall effectiveness. Hedge funds, however, have already begun to respond to the financial crisis by
improving risk-management practices.23 Regulatory reform
for hedge funds should therefore focus on improving existing enforcement priorities and practices, not adding to the
tasks that regulators are expected to perform.
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